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Introduction
In the scholarship concerning constitutional courts around the world there is more and 
more interest not only in the judicial dialogue between those courts and international 
bodies,2 which is deeply grounded in binding international treaties, but also in a hori-
zontal dialogue  – conducted between various jurisdictions which are not part of the 
same legal system.3 It is based on the similarity of constitutional norms and questions 
that have to be answered by the courts in different states. It contributes to the search of 
the best possible solutions, but also raises a number of controversies concerning both the 
legitimacy and the methodology of drawing from the experience of other jurisdictions. 
The aim of this paper is to outline the way in which the Polish Constitutional Tribunal4 
approaches this issue. 
1 An article is a result of the research conducted in the project no. 2014/15/N/HS5/00676 fi-
nanced by the National Science Centre, Poland. It is a slightly revised and translated version of 
an article published in Polish as: Argument komparatystyczny w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konsty-
tucyjnego published in: “Państwo i Prawo” 2017, no. 7, pp. 37–54. 
2 L. Garlicki, Cooperation of courts: The role of supranational jurisdictions in Europe, “International 
Journal of Constitutional Law” 2008, no. 3–4, pp. 509–522; W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and 
the Enlargement of Europe, Oxford, 2012, pp. 27–33.
3 E.g. The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, ed. T, Groppi, M.C. Ponthoreau, 
Oxford–Portland 2013; M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, Oxford 
2013; G. Halmai, Perspectives on Global Constitutionalism. The Use of Foreign and International 
Law, The Hague 2014.
4 On the basis of the Constitution of 1997, the Constitutional Tribunal is a body entrusted with 
the competence to review the constitutionality of norms. It has competences typical for a consti-
tutional court modelled after the German Federal Constitutional Court (with some differences 
concerning mainly the fact that, even in the procedure initiated by the constitutional complaint, it 
reviews only constitutionality of legal provisions and not of the decisions concerning application 
of law). However, due to the fact that the Polish Constitution regulates its status as one of the 
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The paper is based on the assumption that every element of the reasoning presented 
by the Constitutional Tribunal is aimed at justifying its holding and in consequence 
constitutes an element of the decision-making process. Only extraordinarily may it have 
other functions (such as informative or educational). Therefore, I assume that each refer-
ence to the foreign materials made in the reasoning of the Tribunal, is aimed at building 
an argument from comparative law in the case before it, even if the role of this argument 
in the decision-making process is not clearly indicated in the reasoning. 
For the purposes of this paper, I define a comparative reference as any reference to 
the law or jurisprudence that is foreign to the Polish legal system, meaning that it refers 
to legal acts that are not binding in this system. It involves the primary domestic law 
or jurisprudence of other states, but it may also encompass international treaties that 
Poland is not party to.5 A comparative reference has to be clearly distinguished from the 
situations in which the Tribunal refers to the acts of EU or international law, to which 
Poland is a party (as well as to the jurisprudence of the international courts enforcing 
those acts).6 Those norms are a part of Polish legal system and the obligation to comply 
with them results from both Article 9 of the Polish Constitution7 and the particular pro-
visions of international treaties.8 Hence, making reference to them by the Constitutional 
Tribunal is necessary and it constitutes an element of the systemic interpretation of the 
domestic law. 
‘tribunals’ and not one of the ‘courts’ within the meanings of its provisions, I will consistently use 
the term “Constitutional Tribunal” and not the Constitutional Court, when referring to this body. 
However, whenever the “constitutional courts” as a category are referred to, it should be under-
stood as including the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. See further K. Prokop, Polish Constitutional 
Law, Bialystok 2011, p. 157 et seq.
5 Such as The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or the American Convention on 
Human Rights (e.g. judgments of 25 May 2004, case no. SK 44/03 and of 13 October 2009, 
case no. P 4/08). If not indicated otherwise, all judgments referred to in the footnotes are of 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and are available in the electronic version in the Tribunal’s 
database: <https://ipo.trybunal.gov.pl>.
6 On this subject vid., among others, L. Garlicki, Ochrona praw jednostki w XXI w. (globalizacja – 
standardy lokalne – dialog między sądami), in 25 lat transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce i Europie 
Środkowo-Wschodniej, ed. E.  Gdulewicz, W.  Orłowski, S.  Patyra, Lublin 2015, pp. 177–179; 
E. Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World. A Comparative Analysis of the Changing 
Practices of Western Highest Courts, Oxford–Portland 2015, p. 140–163.
7 M.  Laskowska, M.  Taborowski, Obowiązek wykładni przyjaznej prawu Unii Europejskiej  – 
między otwartością na proces integracji a ochroną tożsamości konstytucyjnej, in Prawo Unii Europe-
jskiej a prawo konstytucyjne państw członkowskich, ed. S. Dudzik, N. Półtorak, Warszawa 2013, 
pp. 79–108.
8 E.  Łętowska, Zapewnienie skuteczności orzeczeniom sądów międzynarodowych, “Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy” 2010, no. 10, pp. 18 and 20–22; A. Paprocka, Wpływ orzecznictwa ETPCz 
na rozumienie konstytucyjnych praw i wolności w Polsce – kilka uwag na marginesie orzecznictwa 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, in XV lat obowiązywania Konstytucji z 1997 r. Księga jubileuszowa 
dedykowana Zdzisławowi Jaroszowi, ed. M. Zubik, Warszawa 2012, pp. 77–85.
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In addition to this, I analyse the judgments and decisions of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal issued from 17 October 1997, when the current Polish Constitution entered 
into force, till 20 December 2016, as from this date significant doubts concerning the 
legality and legitimacy of the judgments issued by the Tribunal may be raised.9
The Basis for Comparative Reference in the Polish Legal System
In international legal scholarship, especially American, one may observe heated discus-
sions concerning the admissibility of using arguments from comparative law and juris-
prudence in constitutional adjudication.10 The supporters of comparative references argue 
that extending the scope of the arguments used by constitutional courts contributes to the 
quality and persuasiveness of the reasoning. They underline that the awareness of the so-
lutions adopted in other legal systems serves as an inspiration and allows decisions based 
on more extensive data to be taken.11 They note that the analysis of foreign legislation 
and judicial decisions may provide empirical data useful for predicting the consequences 
9 It is a result of significant constitutional crisis that resulted in the illegal election of a number 
of judges to the Tribunal, the way in which the new President of the Tribunal was elected, and 
a number of further events that allow the legitimacy of a current functioning of the Tribunal 
to be questioned. For more on this issue V. inter alia, A. Śledzińska-Simon, Poland’s Constitu-
tional Tribunal under Siege, VerfBlog, 04.12.2015, https://verfassungsblog.de/polands-consti-
tutional-tribunal-under-siege/ [access: 01.08.2018]; A. Grzelak, Choosing between two Evils: 
the Polish Ombudsman’s Dilemma, VerfBlog, 06.05.2018, https://verfassungsblog.de/choosing-
between-two-evils-the-polish-ombudsmans-dilemma/ [access: 01.08.2018]; M. Matczak, Po-
land’s Constitutional Tribunal under PiS control descends into legal chaos, VerfBlog, 11.01.2017, 
https://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-under-pis-control-descends-into-
legal-chaos/ [access: 01.08.2018]. The developments of the crisis around the Constitutional 
Tribunal were also reflected in opinions by the Venice Commission of 11–12 March 2016, 
CDL-AD(2016)001 and of 14–15 October 2016, CDL-AD(2016)026. 
10 The literature concerning this subject is very extensive. Only some examples include: G. Hal-
mai, The use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law, ed. M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, Oxford 2012, pp. 1330–1333; G. Halmai, Perspectives…, op.cit., 
pp. 181–190; M. Rosenfeld, Comparative Constitutional Analysis in United States Adjudication 
and Scholarship, in Oxford Handbook…, op.cit., pp. 43–52; S. Choudhry, Migration as a new met-
aphor in comparative constitutional law, in The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, ed. S. Choudhry, 
Cambridge 2006, pp. 1–13 and the literature cited there. 
11 S. Breyer, in A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices. The relevance of foreign legal ma-
terials in U.S. constitutional cases: A conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen 
Breyer, “International Journal of Constitutional Law” 2005, no. 4, p. 523; S. Breyer, The Court 
and the World. American Law and the Global Realities, New York 2016, pp. 249–280. In the con-
text of counter-terrorism measures v.: E. Benvenisti, Reclaming Democracy: The Strategic Uses if 
Foreign and International Law by National Courts, “The American Journal of International Law” 
2008, pp. 253–258.
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of certain decisions for the legal system12. They also indicate that the reference to foreign 
sources may help to place the judicial decision not only in the given legal culture, but also 
to show its universal character, which enforces its legitimacy.13 In addition to this, some 
scholars argue that comparing and contrasting the solutions adopted in various sys-
tems may facilitate more profound understanding and assessment of one’s own system.14 
The opponents of using comparative references in the constitutional adjudication 
stress the close relationship between the constitutional text and the principles of national 
sovereignty and the democratic legitimization of constitutional judges. They argue that 
the reference to foreign materials disrupts the democratic process of law-making and the 
principle that decisions concerning a given legal system can be taken only by judges duly 
appointed within this system.15 They emphasize that constitutional interpretation ought 
to be deeply rooted in a constitutional and legal tradition, shaped in a particular social and 
cultural environment, which renders all the reference to the law and jurisprudence that is 
foreign (i.e. shaped in other circumstances) irrelevant.16 Furthermore, they indicate that 
there is no consensus as to the methods by which the comparative material should be 
selected. Hence, the choice of certain materials instead of others is always arbitrary.17
In the Polish legal system, comparative arguments are present, however there is no 
wider discussion between the judges or scholars concerning the basis for their usage and 
its place in constitutional interpretation.18 It seems that one may indicate at least three 
reasons for this lack of controversy. 
Firstly, the most intense controversies concerning the use of foreign materials in the 
constitutional adjudication arise in the common law systems based on the binding role 
of precedent. Traditionally, in those systems making a reference to a particular ruling 
demands identifying its role for the resolution of the case at hand, as either a precedent 
12 V. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, “Harvard Law Re-
view” 2005, p. 116.
13 S. Choudhry, Migration…, op.cit., p. 2; V. Jackson, op.cit., p. 116 and 118; E. Benvenisti, op.cit., 
p. 269. Cf. the opinion of S. Breyer, who notes that citing to the case-law of countries that are 
only now developing their democracy by more established courts (such as the US Supreme 
Court) contributed to the legitimacy and position-building of the court cited to (A conversation 
between…, op.cit., p. 523).
14 G. Frankenberg, Critical Comparison: Re-thinking Comparative Law, “Harvard International 
Law Journal” 1985, no. 2, p. 447; P. Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s Coming of Age? Twenty Years 
after Critical Comparison, “German Law Journal” 2005, no. 7, pp. 1079–1780.
15 A Scalia, in A conversation between…, op.cit., p. 526; C.F. Rosenkrantz, Against borrowings and 
other nonauthorative uses of foreign law, “International Journal of Constitutional Law” 2003, 
no. 2, pp. 84–85
16 L.J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional Adjudication, 
“San Diego Law Review” 2002, no. 1, p. 163.
17 D. Canale, Comparative Reasoning in Legal Adjudication, “Canadian Journal of Law and Juris-
prudence” 2015, no. 1, pp. 13–14.
18 Cf however, L. Garlicki, Ochrona praw…, op.cit., pp. 176–179.
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that has to be followed, as a case that can be distinguished from the present one, or the 
ruling that has to be overturned. Introducing a ruling from a foreign (non-binding) le-
gal system to the reasoning constructed according to this pattern is problematic for the 
coherence and clarity of the judgment.19 However, in continental law systems, in which 
the previous case-law of a given constitutional court or other bodies does not bind the 
courts for future and serves only as an inspiration concerning possible solutions and the 
way to support argumentation, similar problems do not arise.
Secondly, the use of comparative material in the process of constitutional inter-
pretation in Poland is supported by the preparatory works of the 1997 Constitution. 
When the new constitution was drafted, the discussions in the Constitutional Commis-
sion of the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the legal scholarship, drew significantly on 
the legal institutions established in other systems.20 The facts that the foreign solutions 
were widely discussed and applied in the constitution-making process proves that the 
authors of the 1997 Constitution were aware of the correlations between different legal 
systems and allowed inspiration to be drawn from them.21
Thirdly, according to Articles 9 and 91 of the Polish Constitution, Polish courts and 
tribunals are obliged to take into consideration the binding norms of international law 
and the case-law of the international courts. Despite the different significance of such 
reference, the methodology behind it is quite similar to the use of comparative argument 
and the readiness of the Polish judicial bodies to engage in judicial dialogue may influ-
ence the fact that they do not oppose comparative references. 
It also seems that the text of the Polish Constitution itself allows for such references. 
The Constitution does not contain any provision that would oblige or mandate its inter-
preters to take foreign sources into consideration.22 Nonetheless, in its Preamble, it refers 
to the roots of Polish culture, which includes legal culture, in universal human values 
and expresses the awareness of “the need for cooperation with all countries for the good 
of Human Family”.23 Those clauses are too general to serve as a basis for reconstructing 
19 L.J. Blum, op.cit., s. 166; A Scalia, in A conversation between…, op.cit., p. 522.
20 W.  Osiatyński, Paradoxes of constitutional borrowing, “International Journal of Constitutional 
Law” 2003, no. 2, p. 249 et seq.; M.F. Brzeziński, L. Garlicki, Judicial Review in Post-communist 
Poland: the Emergence of a Rechtsstaat?, “Stanford Journal of International Law” 1995, no. 1, p. 35 
et seq. See also with reference to the principle of the democratic state of law: R.R. Ludwikowski, 
Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European Democracies, in Constitutional Cultures, 
ed. M. Wyrzykowski, Warszawa 2000, s. 74ff and with reference to the model of constitutional 
jurisdiction: G. Halmai, Separation of Power – Social Rights – Judicial Review The Polish and the 
Hungarian Cases, in Constitution-making Process,. M. Wyrzykowski, Warszawa 1998, passim.
21 Cf. the opinion of A. Scalia, who clearly distinguished the use of comparative material in the 
process of constitution-making and in adjudication – supported the former and strongly op-
posed the latter (A Conversation between…, pp. 525, 538–539)
22 Cf. Art. 39 Section 1c of the Constitution of South Africa. 
23 Translation by A. Pol and A. Caldwell, in The Constitution of Poland, Warszawa 2007.
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a constitutional norm that would oblige the Polish judiciary in general and the Constitu-
tional Court in particular to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the standards 
adopted in other states. However, they indicate that the authors of the Constitution 
intended it to be open to dialogue with other legal systems and in consequence do not 
allow the possibility of conducting such a dialogue to be excluded, if – in the circum-
stances of a particular case – no constitutional principles or rules oppose it. 
The Practice of Using Comparative Argument 
by the Constitutional Tribunal
The Constitutional Tribunal is quite prone to referring to comparative arguments in its 
reasoning. However, the practice of this reference is varied with respect to the scope, depth 
and subject of the analysis. One can encounter judgments in which the reference to a pro-
vision of foreign law or a statement of a judicial body seems to be incidental and lacking 
in more detailed analysis,24 as well as ones in which a given regulation or decision is care-
fully scrutinised in order to determine its usefulness for the reasoning of the Tribunal.25 
However, in the reasoning of its judgments the Tribunal does not reflect on the axiology 
underlining the use of comparative material in adjudicating constitutional questions, or on 
its aim and function in the decision-making process. It concerns both the lack of abstract 
comments on the methodology of decision-making in general, and the lack of indication 
of the role of certain reference in the particular case before the Tribunal.26 Nonetheless, 
24 In extreme cases, the Constitutional Tribunal refers to a very general statement made by anoth-
er constitutional court without citing its context or significance for a case before the Tribunal 
(e.g. judgments of: 5 May 2004, case no. P 2/02; and 28 June 2005, case no. SK 56/04). With 
respect to those judgments it is difficult to say that the Tribunal formulated a  comparative 
argument as a reference to foreign decisions, since it does not have the character of an analysis, 
but is rather ornamental in nature. 
25 For instance the judgment of 30 September 2008, case no. K 44/07. Cf. with regard to other 
constitutional courts: M. Wendel, Comparative Reasoning and the Making of a Common Consti-
tutional Law – The Europe-Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in a Transnational Perspec-
tive, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 2013, no. 25, pp. 5–12.
26 It formulates only very general statements indicating inter alia that presenting an argument form 
a foreign law is “appropriate” (the judgment of 12 January 2005, case no. K 24/04); that “the Tri-
bunal considers that the standards developed by the foreign judiciary and the underlying values 
are important” and that the given material “deserves attention” (the judgment of 24 Febru-
ary 2010, case no. K 6/09); that “in the context of the present case it is important to present [the 
legal issue at hand] […] in its wider context, including comparative approach” (judgment of 
28 October 2015, case no. K 21/14); that the reference to the comparative material “is a result if 
growing convergence of the modern legal systems” (judgment of 3 July 2008, case no. K 38/07); 
or that “one can note” information concerning comparative law (judgment of 8 March 2000, case 
no. Pp 1/99). In many cases the Tribunal does not indicate any reason for including comparative 
analysis in the reasoning of its judgment (e.g. the judgment of 19 July 2011, case no. K 11/10).
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partial conclusions concerning this matter can be drawn on the basis of the material used 
by the Constitutional Tribunal and the conclusions (if any) drawn from them. 
With regard to the type of the material used, comparative references may be divided 
into referring to: the constitutional provisions of other states,27 other legal provisions of 
foreign domestic law,28 and the case-law of foreign courts and tribunals.29 This division is 
not strict, as the Tribunal sometimes refers to other kinds of sources. Nevertheless, in most 
cases it is possible to determine that the analysis is aimed at the reconstruction of consti-
tutional norms, the examination of possible legislative solutions to certain problems, or the 
inspiration behind the decision on the hierarchical control of norms reached in a different 
legal system. It is evident that the remaining elements of the analysis are supplementary.30 
References to the constitutional provisions of other states are used by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal mainly in order to stress the importance of a given constitutional norm by 
indicating that it is binding not only in the Polish legal system, but that it also constitutes 
part of the common constitutional heritage of a group of states. The group in question 
may be defined as the democratic states in general or states that also fulfil other criteria 
(such as the member states of the EU, parliamentary democracies or even the “majority 
of the European states rooted in the common Christian culture”).31 Such a declaration, 
apart from educational purposes, serves as a starting point for the exercise of balancing 
constitutional values. By emphasizing that a particular principle (especially a fundamen-
tal right or freedom) is common to a significant number of states, the Tribunal stresses 
its universal character and notes that as a result it may be considered as more signifi-
cant than others and its limitation has to be justified by especially compelling reasons.32
More often the Constitutional Tribunal analyses foreign legislation and empirical data 
concerning its application. In those cases the Tribunal adopts one of two approaches. 
27 E.g. the judgment of 26 November 2003, case no. 22/02.
28 E.g. the judgment of 24 February 2010, case no. K 6/09. 
29 E.g. the judgments of 9 July 2007, SK 48/05 and of 19 July 2011, case no. K 11/10.
30 For instance in the judgment of 28 October 2015 (case no. K 21/14) the Tribunal examined 
a number of the judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the no-
tion of “social minimum”. It also briefly referred to certain provisions of German legislation. 
However, the Tribunal’s analysis clearly aimed at the reconstruction of the nature and scope 
of the positive obligations of the state, so it concerned the content of the constitutional norm. 
By contrast, in the judgement of 20 September 2008 (case no. K 44/07) the Tribunal presented 
in a very broad way the legislation concerning the possibility of shutting down a hijacked pas-
senger airplane in Germany and, in less detailed way, in some other states, but it did so only 
in order to present the context of the judgment issued by the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany, which declared such a possibility unconstitutional, and to make this judgment 
a main point of reference in its own analysis.
31 Judgment of 7 October 2015, case no. K 12/14. 
32 E.g. the passages concerning freedom of religion in the judgment of 7 October 2015, case no. 
K 12/14. 
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The first one focuses on verifying whether the operationalization of constitutional 
norms is conducted in different states in the same way, i.e. whether there is one 
“proper” way of regulating certain matter (complying with a  constitutional norm 
present in various legal systems).33 In the case of a positive answer to this question, 
the Tribunal compares whether the solution before it complies with the model it has 
reconstructed. The discrepancies – in the absence of other significant arguments – 
justifies declaring the solution adopted by the Polish lawmaker unconstitutional. In 
the case of a negative answer, the Tribunal holds that the lack of a common model 
grants the lawgiver more latitude as to the way in which it would regulate a given 
matter and the comparative arguments do not support the conclusion, either with 
regard to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the adopted solution. This 
approach is in its essence very similar to the analysis of constitutional provisions of 
other states and, notwithstanding the fact that it focuses on the content of legisla-
tion, is aimed at the reconstruction of the constitutional standard. 
The second approach is based on the supposition that the legislative measures ad-
opted in different states for achieving the same goals may vary. With this in mind, 
the Tribunal examines the way in which various regulations function, assessing their 
usefulness for achieving their goals and their effectiveness in achieving those goals. 
It takes into consideration the wording of the legislation as well as empirical data 
concerning its application.34 Such an examination transfers the role of the comparative 
analysis from the level of reconstructing a constitutional norm to the level of assessing 
the proportionality of the limitation of fundamental rights or freedoms. It may serve 
as a way to verify whether the solution adopted by the Polish lawmaker – if similar 
to ones already in force in other states – may achieve its aims,35 or – if the solution in 
question varies from ones adopted abroad – whether it applies the least invasive means 
of achieving those aims).36 
In addition to this, the comparative references in the jurisprudence of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal may focus on the judgments issued by foreign courts and tribunals., It is 
also possible to identify two types of situation within this category.
33 E.g. judgment of 10 May 2000, case no. K 21/99.
34 E.g. the judgments of 4 November 2014, case no. SK 55/13 and of 9 July 2009, case no. SK 
48/05. 
35 Such examination should be supplemented by the verification of whether the conditions that 
are relevant for the effectiveness of a given regulation in other states are similar to ones occurring 
in the Polish legal system, or whether there are some differences between the legal systems that 
may influence the usefulness and effectiveness of adopting a similar solution in Poland (v., e.g., 
a conclusion of the analysis conducted in the judgment of 4 November 2014, case no. SK 55/13). 
36 More on the structure of the proportionality test in the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitu-
tional Tribunal v., e.g., the judgments of 25 July 2013, case no. P 56/11 and of 16 October 2014, 
case no. SK 20/12. 
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In the first, more common situation, when analysing comparative material, the Tribu-
nal stresses not only the reconstruction of the content of constitutional norm or legisla-
tion, but the outcome of the supervision of the constitutionality of norms conducted 
by other judicial body entrusted with the power to review the constitutionality of law.37 
The Tribunal does not in fact interpret legal norms as such, but borrows the result of the 
examination of their relation to each other.38 It seems that this kind of reasoning serves 
on the one hand as an inspiration for the Tribunal’s decision and, on the other hand, as 
an additional way to legitimize the Tribunal’s ruling, by pointing out that it is compatible 
with the canons of legal reasoning also adopted in other states.39
The second situation is similar to the first one with respect to the aim and the methodol-
ogy of the analysis, but it should be distinguished due to the fact that the focus of the anal-
ysis is not on the foreign court’s resolution of the case, but on the way in which the resolu-
tion was reached. This includes cases in which the reference made concerns the principles 
under which the bodies entrusted with constitutional jurisdiction exercise their compe-
tence. Such references appeared in the case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal when it 
was faced with the problems arising from membership in the European Union and the 
necessity of reconciling the principle of the primary role of the Constitution with the ob-
ligations under the European Union law, as well as with the necessity of drawing lines be-
tween the scope of its jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.40 
The Problems with Methodology
The above analysis indicates that the ways in which the Constitutional Tribunal draws 
on the comparative law are varied. Nonetheless, all of them can be characterized as the 
use of particular, often fragmentary, comparative material chosen on a case-by-case basis. 
Such an approach is pragmatic, as in each case the Tribunal is faced mainly with the task 
of adjudicating a case at hand. It does, however, adversely impact the methodology of 
37 Naturally, the Tribunal should in this situation refer to the content of the constitutional norms 
and the legislation which were analysed in the cited judgment. However, those elements con-
stitute only background information that allows determination of whether the judgment in 
question is relevant for the case before the Tribunal (e.g. the judgment of 30 September 2008, 
case no. K 44/07). 
38 E.g. the judgment of 9 July 2009, case no. SK 48/05.
39 V., e.g., the judgment of 30 September 2008, case no. K 44/07 in which the Tribunal explicitly 
stated that its judgment may be controversial in the eyes of public opinion and seems to defend 
it by pointing out its similarity to decisions taken previously by the constitutional courts in 
Germany and Czech Republic. 
40 V., e.g., judgments of 24 November 2010, K 32/09 and of 16 November 2011, SK 45/09. See also 
W. Sadurski, ‘Solange, chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – Democracy – European 
Union, “European Law Journal” 2007, no. 1, pp. 1–35.
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introducing a comparative argument to the Tribunal’s reasoning.41 This concerns in par-
ticular the choice of the material to be used, the random nature of the references made, 
and the lack of clear indication what role such an argument played in the decision-
making process. 
The Constitutional Tribunal, when selecting the foreign law or case-law to refer 
to, does not usually explain why it found relevant the materials from particular juris-
dictions and omitted those from other countries.42 In some cases this choice – even 
though not clearly justified in the judgments – seems to be based on the similar con-
stitutional history common to a number of states43 or the existence of other relevant 
features due to the fact that they face the same constitutional challenge.44 In other 
cases, the reasons for a particular choice are difficult to identify.45 Among the few clear 
statements concerning the methodology of the use of foreign law by the Tribunal, it 
stated that: “in case of referring to the domestic law of another state, it is necessary to 
establish whether it is adequate to use the foreign model in order to interpret Polish 
law. In particular it is necessary to exercise particular caution in the choice of the legal 
system to which the Tribunal refers.” However, even in the case in which this state-
ment was made, it resulted only in the general conclusion that “in the present case it is 
appropriate to refer to the legal solutions functioning in Germany and in the case-law 
of the European Court of Human Rights” without the indication of any reasons for 
this conclusion.46 
It may be also doubted whether the analysis of the comparative material by 
the Tribunal is detailed enough to conclude that, especially when referring to the 
41 For more on the methodology of comparative constitutional law v. inter alia: M. Tushnet, Some 
reflections on method in comparative constitutional law, in The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, ed. 
S. Choudhry, Cambridge 2006, pp. 68–83; S. Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: 
Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, “Indiana Law Review”1999, no. 3, 
p. 833 et seq.
42 However, there are exceptions. V. judgment of 30 September 2008, K 44/07 where the Tribunal 
reconstrued two approaches to counteracting terrorism in Western democracies and clearly 
indicated why one of them was more relevant for the Polish legal system and judgment of 19 
July 2011, K 11/10 when it clearly referred to the common historic heritage and the similarities 
between the Polish and Hungarian legal system in order to justify referring to the case law of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
43 For instance in cases concerning the lustration or benefits of the former employees of the com-
munist secret services. 
44 Such as being a Member of the EU. 
45 E.g. the reference to the case-law of Germany, United States and Canada in the judgment of 
11 October 2016, SK 28/15.
46 The judgment of 3 July 2008, K 38/07. See also the judgment of 28 October 2015, K 21/14 in 
which the Tribunal stated “The Constitutional Tribunal held that in the circumstances of the 
present case it is important to present the issue of the minimum of existence in the broader 
context, including the comparative perspective. For this reason, the Tribunal presented this is-
sue by invoking the German legal system”.
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foreign legislation, it found all the elements that were relevant to the reconstruc-
tion of a  functional equivalent47 of the assessed Polish regulation in a  given le-
gal system. This problem can arise especially in situations in which the Tri-
bunal examines the constitutionality of a  regulation that is aimed at provid-
ing a  proper balance between two conflicting constitutional values, but it refers 
only to those elements of foreign legislation that serve the preservation of one of 
those principles and omits those that serve the realization of the other principle.48 
Finally, it is problematic that the Constitutional Tribunal does not formulate any 
statements concerning the role of comparative argument in constitutional interpretation 
or making decisions on the supervision of norms. In most cases in which reference to 
foreign materials is made, it is placed in a separate part of the reasoning (as a separate 
section or in one section with the analysis of international law). The material described 
there is not referenced later on, when the sensu stricto analysis of the Polish law relevant 
for the outcome of the case takes place.49 This practice significantly limits the argumen-
tative value of comparative references in the case-law, and results in the fact that their 
role, other than informative and educational, is difficult to grasp. 
Conclusion
The above analysis indicates that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is relatively open 
to dialogue with other jurisdictions, which – in principle – seems to be both within the 
spirit of the 1997 Constitution and pragmatic with regard to today’s world of multi-
level and multi-centred legal systems, in which similar problems arise all over the globe. 
However, the analysis also shows that in order to fully develop the pragmatic, legitimis-
ing and persuasive potential of this horizontal dialogue, more stress should be placed on 
the way in which comparative references are introduced to the Tribunal’s case-law. In 
particular, the Tribunal should indicate, in a more consistent way, the place of compara-
tive argument in its decision-making process and justify the choices it makes with this 
respect. 
47 J.C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, “American Journal of Comparative Law” 1998, no. 4, 
p. 620 et seq. 
48 E.g. the judgment of 7 October 2015, K 12/14 in which the Tribunal analysed the ways in which 
different legislations provided the right to conscious objection to medical professionals, but 
failed to take into consideration the solutions that guarantee patients’ rights in such situations. 
49 Cf. the judgment of 4 November 2014, SK 55/13. 
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summary
An Argument from Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal
The use of references to foreign law and jurisprudence by the constitutional courts 
around the world currently gains more and more attention from scholars. The admis-
sibility and usefulness of conducting such a horizontal dialogue between various juris-
dictions raises controversies in other countries, but not in Poland, where no significant 
academic discussion on the legal basis and justification for using comparative arguments 
in constitutional jurisprudence has been conducted. The reasons for this lack of contro-
versy seem to lie in the roots of the 1997 Constitution, and the way in which the Polish 
legal system is constructed. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal is quite prone to using 
comparative references in its reasoning. However, it rarely clearly indicated their role 
or significance for the resolution of the case before it. The analysis of the case-law of 
the Tribunal indicates that references to foreign law concern constitutional provisions, 
legislation, and the judgments of other constitutional courts. The purpose of the refer-
ences stresses the universality of particular constitutional norms and deciphering their 
meaning, as well as gathering data significant for the assessment of the proportionality 
of a national law, as well as at drawing inspiration from the decisions taken by foreign 
courts. However, the persuasive use of a comparative argument demands that the meth-
odological problems which can be noticed in the case-law should be addressed. They in-
volve in particular: the need to justify the choice of comparative material that is analysed, 
the fragmented nature of the analysis, and the lack of a clear indication what role these 
kind of arguments have in constitutional argumentation.
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comparative law, comparative interpretation
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